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Abstract 
In this paper I mainly seek to test the robustness of Hanushek et al.’s (2013) hypothesis, 
according to which the impact of autonomy in terms of learning outcomes differs across 
levels of development, being positive for developed countries but not for developing 
countries. I do so by constructing a school-level measure of autonomy, which I instrument 
using the distinction between de jure and de facto autonomy, as laid out by Gunnarsson et al. 
(2009). I also follow them in differentiating between parents participation and school 
autonomy, thus providing an explanation to their results, in line with the conceptual 
framework of Hanushek et al. (2013). 
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1. Introduction 
The view that human capital (Becker 1964) in general, and cognitive skills (Hanushek & 
Woessmann 2008) in particular, are key ingredients in the recipe of human and economic 
development is rather consensual. Much less so are the ways to invest in them and speed up 
their accumulation. 
Until recently this issue was raised in quantitative terms, that is, if human capital remained 
scarce in many parts of the world, it was in part because access to education too was limited 
there. Increasing supply would therefore remedy such situation and promote learning. And 
indeed, many children were brought into classrooms and school attainment
1
 rose in many 
developing countries (UNESCO 2012). 
Yet, the actual learning outcomes for those same children proved disappointing. The 
performance of developing countries in international assessment programs is still lagging 
behind that of their richer counterparts. Similarly, evaluations conducted in several such 
countries revealed that a significant part - in some cases the majority - of children enrolled at 
a given grade level were unable to read texts or perform computations which can be found in 
lower grades (see for instance in Kenya, Uwezo 2011). 
As a consequence, the issue has recently shifted from the quantity to the quality of education. 
The focus is now on the learning experience of students (instead of their mere presence at 
school) and on how best to optimize it (Hanushek & Woessmann 2008). In this regard, the 
institutional set-up under which governments manage the provision of education is of prime 
importance. A practical aspect of this is the role given to different loci of decision, in other 
words, the degree of (de)centralization of schooling systems. In fact, decentralizing the 
management of educational services, and, in particular, granting schools autonomy in 
decision-making have been viewed by development institutions as a way for developing 
countries to achieve higher quality education delivery in spite of low-quality institutions 
(Gunnarsson 2009, Patrinos, 2011). 
However, the literature on the impact of school autonomy
2
 has proven rather inconclusive. On 
one hand, properly identifying such an impact is difficult, and on the other hand, when studies 
propose robust identification strategies, they often reach conflicting results. For instance, 
                                                          
1
 School attainment corresponds to the highest grade completed in one’s educational career. 
2
 School autonomy is used as a synonym to school-base management, with the implied consideration that they 
point to the same phenomenon: some measure of responsibility in decision-making being transferred from higher 
levels of governance to school agents. 
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Clark (2009) finds a positive and significant impact of an autonomy reform in the United 
Kingdom using a version of the regression discontinuity design, while in the context of Latin 
America, Gunnarsson et al. (2009), using an instrumental variable strategy, find no evidence 
of a positive impact of school autonomy.  
In reaction to these mixed patterns, Hanushek et al. (2013) argue that the impact of school 
autonomy in terms of students learning outcomes is heterogeneous across levels of 
development. Namely, school autonomy would be good for developed countries, but not so 
for poorer countries. They reach this conclusion by constructing a country-by-year measure of 
autonomy within a fixed effect framework so as to estimate its impact on individual students’ 
test scores. By doing so, they neutralize the risks of selection bias and general equilibrium 
effects and also control for unobserved country- (and year-) specific heterogeneity. If their 
findings are indeed robust, then it is highly consequential for development policies, given the 
popularity school autonomy enjoys among the development community. Nevertheless, their 
identification strategy is still vulnerable to biases stemming from possible time-varying 
country confounders. 
My main purpose in this paper is therefore to test the robustness of Hanushek et al.’s (2013) 
findings. To do so, I combine their approach with an instrumentation strategy inspired by that 
of Gunnarsson et al. (2009) so as to construct a school-level measure of autonomy which 
produces unbiased estimates of its impact on students’ learning outcomes. I also follow 
Gunnarsson et al. (2009) by differentiating between school autonomy and parents 
participation when estimating the impact of the former. This in turns allows me to rationalize 
the results they obtained with a Latin American sample. Finally, I also improve on Hanushek 
et al.’s (2013) work on a technical aspect by implementing the computational methods 
recommended by the OECD (2009) when it comes to working with plausible values and 
estimating standard errors with their complex sample data.  
The next section briefly presents the conceptual framework I use for this paper. Section 3 
includes a discussion on estimation issues relative to measuring the impact of school 
autonomy. Section 4 presents the data I use and some descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents 
the regression results, as well as a few robustness checks. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
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2. Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework for this work draws mainly on that of Hanushek et al. (2013), 
which as be described as follows. They regard the school autonomy puzzle in terms of a 
principal-agent framework, with the central administration in charge of education (the 
principal) delegating some managerial power to the schools (the agents). 
Such delegation may lead to positive outcomes as it allows agents to use their superior local 
knowledge and strengthens the incentives to achieve high academic standards by bringing the 
decisions closer to the recipients (Patrinos 2011). Yet, its success will also depend on the 
alignment of interests between the principal and the agents, and on the degree of information 
asymmetry that exists between them as well as on the technical capacity of the agents to 
handle more decisional power. 
Accordingly, if one assumes that more developed countries are less prone to agency issues 
because they have more reliable institutions and a better educated population, then school 
autonomy is likely to be positive for them, but not for developing countries, for whom it may 
in fact be detrimental to students learning outcomes. 
This framework can be refined by distinguishing between two categories of agents, school 
staffs on one hand; and parent groups on the other hand. In fact, while both are subject to their 
possibly limited technical capacity, it can be assumed that divergence of interests is a more 
acute issue in the case of school staffs than in that of parent groups. Indeed since parents who 
send their children to school can reasonably be assumed to want them to receive the best 
education possible, their goal is basically aligned with that of the administration in charge of 
education, namely, educating children. 
3. Estimation issues and identification strategies 
When using survey data, learning outcomes can be described with the help of an education 
production function, which typically model achievement as a function of different inputs: 
students, parents, teachers and schools characteristics (Glewwe 2002; Glewwe & Kremer 
2006).  
Following Hanushek et al. (2013), one may consider the institutional set-up regarding 
decision-making in the educational system as a term similar to total factor productivity in 
more general production functions. This entails that the student achievement resulting from 
any set of inputs will be determined by the decision-making institutions. However, one may 
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suspect that these institutions are not purely exogenous if, for instance, the best students 
and/or the best teachers are attracted to the most autonomous schools. 
To circumvent this selection bias as well as potential general equilibrium effects, Hanushek et 
al. (2013) define autonomy at the country-by-year level. More precisely, they measure 
autonomy as the proportion of schools within a country, and for a given year, which exert 
autonomous decision-making, and estimate its impact by running estimations with country 
(and year) fixed effect, as allowed by the panel structure of their data. As a result however, 
they cannot provide a school-level interpretation, but instead have to concentrate on a cross-
country analysis, with all the risks this entails in terms of proper identification. Indeed, 
although they control for time-invariant, country-specific factors
3
, their results may well 
suffer from the influence of correlated unobserved time-varying country factors, such as 
concomitant educational reforms. 
Another approach is the instrumental variable (IV) strategy of Gunnarsson et al. (2009), 
which is based on a distinction between autonomy as it is prescribed by the law (de jure 
autonomy) and as it actually exists within each school (de facto autonomy). They argue that 
school agents (e.g. principals and parents) choose how much managerial effort they will exert 
(de facto autonomy) based on their school and school attendees characteristics. In this context, 
the laws on decision-making in the education system (de jure autonomy) only act as a 
moderating mechanism, making autonomous management more or less difficult, but do not in 
effect dictate the decision-making process of each school. In the words of the authors: “Even 
if the constitutionally mandated locus of control over schools resides with the central 
government, it does not necessarily prevent the exercise of local control over the school, but 
[it] will raise the cost of exerting local authority” (Gunnarsson et al. 2009: p. 39). 
Under these conditions and the identifying assumption that existing legal responsibilities for 
school management are not set in response to contemporaneous test scores, it is possible to 
use de jure autonomy as an excluded instrument for de facto autonomy and therefore obtain 
an unbiased estimation of the impact of autonomy on students’ outcomes. This results in a 
cross-country analysis too, as the excluded instrument (de jure autonomy) is at the country 
level. However, its flavor is different to that of Hanushek et al. (2013), in particular regarding 
the interpretation of the results. Indeed, the IV approach keeps the focus of the analysis at the 
school-level, although the variation across schools in decision-making which identifies the 
                                                          
3
 As well as year-specific shocks (cf. year fixed effect). 
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impact of autonomy is that which is tied to variation in national laws.  
The main caveat from Gunnarsson et al. (2009) stems from the cross-sectional nature of their 
data, which prevents them from combining their IV strategy with fixed effects. Similarly, 
estimating the impact of autonomy at the school level makes it very difficult to disentangle 
general equilibrium effects. 
In this paper, I try to combine both approaches in order to estimate the impact of school 
autonomy. In particular, I build an international PISA panel database which I combine with 
Education at a glance (EAG) data on decision-making rules in lower public secondary 
education so as to use the IV approach along with fixed effects to estimate the school-level 
impact of autonomy. PISA data will provide a proxy for autonomy as it exists de facto in each 
school it samples, while EAG data will reflect de jure autonomy, as it is prescribed by the law 
in every country at certain points in time. This will then allow me to test Hanushek et al.’s 
(2013) central hypothesis. I also make use of country-level autonomy measures so as to fully 
take advantage of the range of my data and to propose a discussion on parents participation, in 
the vein of Gunnarsson et al. (2009). The next section describes the data I use, including the 
measures of autonomy and the instruments, and also provides some descriptive statistics. 
4. International panel data 
a. Construction of a PISA panel dataset 
The primary source of data used in this study comes from the Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA), conducted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) every 3 years since 2000. Consequently, data are available on the PISA 
website for years 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012. PISA 2012 was not available at the time 
Hanushek et al. (2013) first drafted their work. The inclusion of this wave is one of the 
contributions of this study. In fact, as PISA grew older, each wave included more and more 
non-OECD countries, among which several developing and emerging countries. In particular, 
PISA 2012 included 65 countries, with 31 non-OECD countries. 
PISA tests 15-year-old students, regardless of grade or school type
4
. The main reason for this 
age is that it roughly corresponds to the end of compulsory education in OECD countries. The 
sampling procedure generally takes place in two-steps: schools in which 15-year-old are 
                                                          
4
 In reality, the spectrum of PISA students’ grades is actually limited and ranges from 7 to 12, which roughly 
corresponds to lower and upper secondary education. 
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enrolled are selected, with their probability of selection being proportional to their size. Then, 
a subset of students is sampled in each selected school. Sampling conditions are strictly 
monitored to ensure the student samples are representative of the relevant populations. This in 
turn implies that schools are targeted to optimize the sampling of students. PISA school 
samples are therefore not representative of the populations of schools with 15-year-old 
students in participating countries (OECD 2009). Also, the country-specific school samples 
are not the same from one year to another. Therefore, aggregating PISA waves yields a panel 
of data at the country level, while at the school level, it only produces a repeated cross-
section. 
PISA tests the reading, mathematical and scientific literacy of participants in terms of how 
well they can apply the knowledge and skills they have acquired to real-life situations. These 
tests are two-hour long pencil-and-paper tests, including both multiple-choice and open 
questions. Math scores are used as the main measure of learning outcomes throughout this 
paper, with the idea that mathematical proficiency is more readily comparable across 
countries than science and especially reading
5
. Math scores are also the basis for the results of 
Hanushek et al. (2013). Test scores for all three subjects are scaled so that, across OECD 
countries, the mean is 500 and one standard deviation equals 100
6
. 
In addition to test scores, PISA surveys also include a student questionnaire and a school 
questionnaire, which respectively provide information on the background of students and their 
families, and on various features of schools functioning. The school questionnaire is 
addressed to school principals, and as such, the answers it produces should be considered as 
reflecting the views of school principals on autonomy, as it is implemented in their particular 
school (Hanushek et al. 2013). Each questionnaire is embedded in a single dataset. The 
student dataset includes test scores too. 
The PISA panel database was constructed in several steps. First, I selected the relevant raw 
variables from the student and school datasets for each wave from 2000 to 2012
7
. Then I 
harmonized data between waves and recoded them to fit the regression analysis. Third, I 
merged the student and school datasets and then proceeded with the building of the country-
level autonomy measures. Since PISA schools are not a representative sample of countries’ 
                                                          
5
 2SLS results are presented in the appendix (see Table A3) for science and reading. 
6
 In fact math scores were measured differently in 2000. I account for such year-specific common shocks by 
using year fixed effects. 
7
 The objective was to match the controls listed in the appendix of Hanushek et al. (2013). 
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school populations, their characteristics are better considered as those of their respective 
students, the student samples being representative of the student populations (OECD 2009). 
This is why the computations necessary for the construction of autonomy measures have to be 
done after the merger, at the student level
8
. Finally, I appended the merged file of each wave 
to one another from 2000 to 2012 and built the school-level autonomy measures. 
At this point, what will be called henceforth the Full PISA sample can be obtained. In that, I 
follow Hanushek et al. (2013) by selecting only observations from countries which 
participated in at least three of the five waves available
9
. In order to compare the structure of 
my samples to theirs, I also use the World Bank income classification of countries of 2002. 
The Full PISA sample includes 1,591,278 students from 53 countries in total with 3 low-
income countries, 11 lower-middle-income countries, 11 upper-middle-income countries and 
28 high-income countries
10
. In total, nine additional non-high-income countries are included 
in the analysis compared to Hanushek et al. (2013) and thanks to the availability of wave 
2012. This roughly corresponds to an additional 600,000 students included in the sample. 
Finally, data from the full PISA sample are completed with countries’ GDP per capita in 
constant 2005 USD for year 2000 taken from the World Bank Development Indicators which 
I will hereon refer to as “initial” GDP p.c.. 
A major issue with such observational data is missing values. Dropping observations with at 
least one missing value for any variable of interest results in loosing roughly half of the data. 
For this reason, I follow Hanushek et al. (2013) again in imputing values for observations 
with missing controls by using country-by-wave means and I also include a dummy for 
imputed values in the regressions to control for the imputation. Next I give more details on the 
measures of autonomy. 
b. Measuring de facto autonomy 
As explained earlier, my main goal is to combine the approaches of Gunnarsson et al. (2009) 
and Hanushek et al. (2013) to provide a further test to the central hypothesis of the latter. The 
main element in doing so is to measure de facto autonomy at the school level. However, data 
                                                          
8
 See below for details on the construction process of autonomy measures. 
9
 As mentioned before, Hanushek et al.’s (2013) sample actually ranges from 2000 to 2009. They therefore 
selected only countries which participated in at least three of the four waves they had available.  
10
 Montenegro and Serbia were not included in the World Bank classification, but I consider them as low-income 
countries due to their low level of GDP p.c. in 2000 and the promiscuity with the end of the Yugoslav wars. 
Also, not all “high-income countries” are countries, e.g. Macao in China. Unlike Hanushek et al. (2013), I 
decided not to exclude small educational systems from the sample, except Liechtenstein which is a notable 
outlier in terms of GDP p.c.. 
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for the instruments do not exactly match PISA data (see below). In particular, they do not 
allow taking advantage of the inclusion of new developing and emerging countries, as made 
possible by the addition of the latest PISA wave. Therefore, I also construct and use an 
autonomy measure at the country level, in the style of Hanushek et al. (2013), to fully exploit 
the range of my data. 
The raw questionnaire items used in both cases are the same as theirs. To be precise, I use a 
question asked to principals in every wave, regarding who has the main responsibility for 
different tasks
11
. I focus on one category of autonomy, academic-content autonomy, due to 
limited data availability concerning my instruments (see below). To do so, I use the same 
tasks as Hanushek et al. (2013): deciding which courses are offered; determining course 
content; and choosing which textbooks are used. 
For each task, the question allowed principals to tick more than one item, with each item 
corresponding to different levels of governance. Since I am interested in full autonomy, which 
is the basis of Hanushek et al.’s (2013) results,  I consider a school as autonomous in a given 
task only if at least one school-level agent (the principal, teachers, the school board, or 
department heads) holds the main responsibility for this task while no non-school-level agent 
does. In other words, if responsibility is shared by one or more school agents and any other 
institution at a higher level of governance (e.g. national education authorities), then the 
corresponding school is not considered to be autonomous. I construct a dummy reflecting this 
divide for each task and for every school, with value 1 reflecting full autonomy and 0 the 
absence of full autonomy.  
The last step consists in combining these dummies. However, this is not done in the same way 
for the country-level and the school-level measures. The country-level measure of academic-
content autonomy is obtained in two steps. First, each task dummy is aggregated at the 
country-by-wave level by taking the corresponding proportion of schools which are 
considered autonomous in the relevant task
12
. Then, these proportions are combined across 
the three tasks by taking the average of them three. 
                                                          
11
 To be exactly accurate, PISA 2000 and 2003 asked principals “who has the main responsibility...” and PISA 
2006 up to 2012 asked “who has considerable responsibility...”. This slight difference is captured by the 
inclusion of year fixed effects in every estimation. 
12
 In fact, as mentioned earlier, this aggregation is done at the student level, since school characteristics are better 
considered as those of their students (OECD 2009). What is actually computed is therefore the proportion of 
students in the sample who are enrolled in autonomous schools for the relevant task, for each country-year 
nexus. 
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To generate the school-level measure of academic-content autonomy, which I will use to 
measure de facto autonomy, I use the simple average of the three task dummies
13
. Finally, I 
standardize the resulting indexes for de facto academic-content across the sample I use to 
perform the two-stage least-squares estimation. A minor drawback of the school-level 
measure comes from data attrition with some schools registering missing values. However, 
this represents only around 5 percents of observations at the student level. In the following 
section, I describe the data used for the instruments and the construction of the corresponding 
sample. 
c. Education at a glance instruments: autonomy de jure 
As mentioned before, the measures of autonomy de jure which I use as excluded instruments 
are taken from Education at a glance (EAG) data (OECD 1998, OECD 2004, OECD 2008, 
OECD 2012). EAG provides data on where and how decisions are taken in various education 
systems in lower public secondary education, which corresponds to the grade levels where the 
majority of students participating in PISA were studying at the time of testing. These 
indicators are based on surveys of panels of experts from each participating country. Experts 
are chosen from three levels of government (central, middle and school level) and are asked 
who decides and how in their country according to applicable rules or to the most common 
practices.  
The different levels of decision include the central, federal, regional, sub-regional, local and 
school levels. The modes of decision refer to either: full autonomy, after consultation, within 
a framework or others. 
Data are available for the items corresponding to the PISA tasks used to build the de facto 
measure of academic-content autonomy, namely: the choice of textbook, the design of study 
programmes (corresponding to the PISA item related to the choice of courses offered) and the 
definition of course content. Unfortunately, data are not available in this format for other 
items related to the fields of personnel and budget management, which is why I focus on 
                                                          
13
 Gunnarsson et al. (2009) use a weighted average to create their school-level measure of autonomy, with 
weights corresponding to the first principal component of each task dummy. Doing so with my data gives very 
similar results compared with using non-weighted averages. In fact, the weights generated with a principal 
component analysis are roughly similar across task dummies in the case of my data. Therefore, using weighted 
or simple averages makes very little difference. 
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academic-content autonomy
14
. 
I construct three de jure academic-content autonomy variables, based on the afore-mentioned 
items. For each of them, I input the value 2 if schools are considered as fully-autonomous 
decision-makers, 1 if they bear the burden of decision but do so after consultation, within a 
framework or according to other processes. Finally, these variables take the value 0 if schools 
are not the decision makers, regardless of the mode of decision. Although I’m interested in 
full autonomy, I still find it useful to distinguish between the last two cases, since, on the 
field, consultation processes or frameworks may have limited scope, thus leading to de facto 
full autonomy. 
The main limitation of EAG data is their limited coverage. Not all countries participating in 
PISA have EAG data and vice-versa. Similarly, data availability for EAG is more restricted in 
terms of year than it is for PISA and does not exactly cover the same periods. To be precise, 
EAG indicators of interest are available for years 1998, 2003, 2007 and 2011. I match these 
EAG waves with the most contemporaneous PISA waves, that is, EAG 1998 is matched with 
PISA 2000, EAG 2003 with PISA 2003, EAG 2007 with PISA 2006 and EAG 2011 with 
PISA 2012. PISA wave 2009 is therefore lost. Also, since the selected indicators concern the 
management of public schools only, private schools are excluded from the sample. 
In spite of their limited scope, EAG data are available for several countries and years, which 
therefore allow me to combine the IV approach with fixed effects. Also, the correspondence 
in terms of years is such that the exclusion restriction for the instrumentation is credible, at 
least regarding reciprocity. For instance, the laws on school autonomy in force in 2003 could 
hardly have been set up in response to the PISA scores of the same year. As result, EAG 
measures of de jure autonomy are unlikely to be related to PISA test scores other than through 
their effect on the de facto autonomy of schools as measured by PISA
15
. 
By merging EAG data with those of PISA for public schools, I obtain what is thereon referred 
to as the EAG-PISA sample. I again follow Hanushek et al. (2013) in selecting only countries 
which participated in at least three of the four available waves. I also complete the resulting 
                                                          
14
 Data related to these fields are only available at a higher level of aggregation which makes them unfit for my 
identification strategy.
 
15
 This argument is more tentative when considering the matching of PISA 2006 with EAG 2007, although it is 
still reasonable to assume that the inertia in educational reforms prevents a strong causality from running from 
PISA 2006 test scores to EAG 2007 measures of legal autonomy. Another concern is that EAG measures of legal 
autonomy could be correlated with time-varying omitted variables tied to test scores. At the very least, they are 
not significantly correlated with country-level characteristics, be it GDP p.c. or controls aggregated at the 
country level (not shown). 
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base with data on initial GDP p.c.. The EAG-PISA sample is much more restricted in terms of 
non-high-income countries. It comprises 20 countries with just three upper-middle-income 
countries and no lower-middle-income or low-income countries whatsoever. This being said, 
the EAG-PISA sample still includes 449,498 students after accounting for the 5% of missing 
values for the autonomy variables (cf. supra). The next section presents some descriptive 
statistics on the Full PISA sample and the EAG-PISA sample. 
d. Descriptive statistics 
Figure 1 plots initial country mean scores in math against initial GDP p.c.. This plot allows to 
visualize the different countries encountered in the analysis in terms of how developed they 
are when it comes to schooling outcomes and income. Countries included in both the Full 
PISA and the EAG-PISA samples are marked in black, countries which are only present in the 
Full PISA sample are in grey. 
Figure 1 shows that in general, richer countries perform better in PISA, especially when 
setting aside Luxembourg and the Qatar. However, there still is substantial variation in test 
scores across countries with similar income levels and vice-versa. For instance, Brazil and 
Estonia have a comparable initial GDP p.c. but are located at opposite ends in terms of test 
scores. Estonia actually performs better than the US and Norway which are some of the 
richest countries in the sample. In a similar fashion, Korea performs better than all but the tree 
countries when it comes to initial PISA math score, although its initial income per capita is far 
from ranging among the highest. 
  
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.20
14 
 
Figure 1 - Initial GDP p.c. vs. initial PISA math score 
Notes: Country codes: ALB-Albania; AUS-Australia; AUT-Austria; BEL-Belgium; BGR-Bulgaria; BRA-Brazil; 
CAN-Canada; CHE-Switzerland; CHL-Chile; COL-Colombia; CZE-Czech Republic; DEU-Germany; DNK-
Denmark; ESP-Spain; EST-Estonia; FIN-Finland; GBR-United Kingdom; GRC-Greece; HKG-Hong Kong SAR. 
China; HRV-Croatia; HUN-Hungary; IDN-Indonesia; IRL-Ireland; ISL-Iceland; ISR-Israel; ITA-Italy; JOR-
Jordan; JPN-Japan; KOR-Korea. Rep.; LTU-Lithuania; LUX-Luxembourg; LVA-Latvia; MAC-Macao SAR. 
China; MEX-Mexico; MNE-Montenegro; NLD-Netherlands; NOR-Norway; NZL-New Zealand; PER-Peru; 
POL-Poland; PRT-Portugal; QAT-Qatar; ROM-Romania; RUS-Russian Federation; SRB-Serbia; SVK-Slovak 
Republic; SVN-Slovenia; SWE-Sweden; THA-Thailand; TUN-Tunisia; TUR-Turkey; URY-Uruguay; USA-
United States. Countries in grey are present only in the Full PISA sample, while countries in black are included 
in both the EAG-PISA sample and the Full PISA sample. 
Next, Figure 2 presents a scatter plot of the change in academic-content autonomy, measured 
at the country level, versus the change in PISA math score, between the last and first years in 
which countries entered the sample. Here, high income countries are represented in grey, and 
non-high income countries in black. The grey line is the linear fit for high income countries. It 
displays a positive slope. What’s more, most of high income countries are located either in the 
lower left or upper right quadrants. On the contrary, the dashed black line, which represents 
the linear fit for non-high income countries, is downward sloping. While there are a few non-
high income countries in the upper right quadrant, it is nonetheless clear that non-high income 
countries which experienced the highest increase in PISA math score have restricted school 
autonomy over time, as is evident from the cases of Peru, Brazil and Chile. There is therefore 
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descriptive evidence of a heterogeneous relationship between academic-content autonomy and 
achievement, across levels of economic development. 
 
Figure 2 - Change in acad.-content autonomy vs. change in math score 
Notes: Country codes: ALB-Albania; AUS-Australia; AUT-Austria; BEL-Belgium; BGR-Bulgaria; BRA-Brazil; 
CAN-Canada; CHE-Switzerland; CHL-Chile; COL-Colombia; CZE-Czech Republic; DEU-Germany; DNK-
Denmark; ESP-Spain; EST-Estonia; FIN-Finland; GBR-United Kingdom; GRC-Greece; HKG-Hong Kong SAR. 
China; HRV-Croatia; HUN-Hungary; IDN-Indonesia; IRL-Ireland; ISL-Iceland; ISR-Israel; ITA-Italy; JOR-
Jordan; JPN-Japan; KOR-Korea. Rep.; LTU-Lithuania; LUX-Luxembourg; LVA-Latvia; MAC-Macao SAR. 
China; MEX-Mexico; MNE-Montenegro; NLD-Netherlands; NOR-Norway; NZL-New Zealand; PER-Peru; 
POL-Poland; PRT-Portugal; QAT-Qatar; ROM-Romania; RUS-Russian Federation; SRB-Serbia; SVK-Slovak 
Republic; SVN-Slovenia; SWE-Sweden; THA-Thailand; TUN-Tunisia; TUR-Turkey; URY-Uruguay; USA-
United States. High income countries are represented in grey, non-high income countries in black. The change 
which is plotted is that which occurred between the last and first years in which each country entered the sample. 
Academic-content autonomy is measured at the country level. The dashed black line is the linear fit for high 
income countries; the grey one is the linear fit for all other countries. 
Tables A1 in the appendix sums up this information in the form of a table, presenting levels 
for variables of interest (GDP p.c., PISA math score and academic-content autonomy) for the 
dates at which countries enter and leave the samples, usually 2000 and 2012 respectively. 
Table 1 below shows the correlation between de jure and de facto measures of academic-
content autonomy. In line with the argumentation developed by Gunnarsson et al. (2009), the 
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correlations between respective items of prescribed and actual autonomy are positive, but 
rather humbly so. In other words, from this descriptive perspective, de facto autonomy indeed 
seems to be largely determined by factors others than de jure autonomy, thus supporting the 
view that actual autonomy is endogenously determined in each school, and only moderated 
but not dictated by legal prescriptions. 
Table 1 - Correlation matrix, de jure and de facto autonomy 
  
De jure autonomy 
 
De facto autonomy 
Textbook 
choice 
Course 
offered 
Course 
content 
 Textbook 
choice 
Course 
offered 
Course 
content 
Academic-
content   
D
e 
ju
re
 a
u
to
n
o
m
y
 Textbook 
choice 
1 
       
        
Course 
offered 
0.410*** 1 
      
        
Course 
content 
0.227*** 0.486*** 1 
     
        
          
D
e 
fa
ct
o
 a
u
to
n
o
m
y
 
Textbook 
choice 
0.385*** 0.151*** 0.101*** 
 
1 
   
        
Course 
offered 
0.253*** 0.227*** 0.260*** 
 
0.327*** 1 
  
        
Course 
content 
0.174*** 0.151*** 0.270*** 
 
0.342*** 0.600*** 1 
 
        
Academic-
content 
0.316*** 0.222*** 0.277*** 
 
0.622*** 0.855*** 0.861*** 1 
         
Figure A1 to A3 in the appendix show the evolution of de jure and de facto academic-content 
autonomy over time for all countries in the EAG-PISA sample. They provide a graphical 
illustration of the stylized fact emphasized by Table 1: there is some measure of correlation 
between prescribed and actual autonomy, but it is rather partial. The next section goes beyond 
descriptive statistics and into the regression analysis. 
5. Regression analysis 
I start by presenting the baseline equation of Hanushek et al. (2013) along with the results it 
produces when replicated with the Full PISA sample and the EAG-PISA sample. Then I 
introduce the two stages of the instrumental procedure and present the results they yield as 
well as those of a simple least square estimation, for the sake of comparison. Finally, I discuss 
the results obtained when including parents participation in the analysis, using country-level 
measures of both participation and autonomy. 
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All results are computed according to the method recommended by the OECD (2009)
 16
. This 
includes making use of all plausible values
17
 to produce estimations, through a multiple 
imputation method; and using a balanced repeated replication procedure to estimate standard 
errors, so as to take into account the complex sampling procedure of PISA. Ignoring the 
former or the latter can lead to biased estimations and inaccurate standard errors respectively 
(see von Davier et al. n.d.). As such, this represents a minor technical improvement on 
Hanushek et al. (2013) who used country clustering to compute standard errors and did not 
precise how they used of plausible values. 
a. Cross-country analysis: replications in the style of Hanushek et al. (2013) 
The empirical model which Hanushek et al. (2013) estimate can be described as follows: 
𝑇𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖 = 𝛼1𝐼𝑐𝑡 + 𝛼2(𝐼𝑐𝑡 × 𝐷𝑐) + 𝛽𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜇𝑐 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖 
where the test score 𝑇 of student 𝑖 enrolled in school 𝑠 at time 𝑡 in country 𝑐 is a function of 
her country’s educational institutions in terms of decision-making (i.e. autonomy) 𝐼, and of 
her family (𝐹) and school (𝑆) inputs. The model is estimated with country (𝜇𝑐) and year (𝜇𝑡) 
fixed effect. 𝐷 stands for the level of development of country 𝑐. 𝜀𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖 is an error term
18
. 
𝑇 is measured with PISA scores in mathematics. Family and school characteristics, 𝐹 and 𝑆, 
include a set of characteristics about the gender and age of students, their migratory status and 
socio-economical background, the size of their school, etc. The full set is presented in the 
appendix. Here, autonomy is measured at the country level for academic content, in the style 
of Hanushek et al. (2013). The development level is captured by the initial GDP p.c., 
measured in logs. Finally, since the analysis is at the student level, country and year fixed 
effects are included in the form of 𝑁 − 1 dummies. 
The interest lies in estimating 𝛼 =
𝜕𝑇
𝜕𝐼
, the impact of autonomy on test scores. I do so with the 
Full PISA sample and the EAG-PISA sample, in order to replicate the analysis of Hanushek 
et al. (2013) with an extended set of developing and emerging countries, and, later, to 
                                                          
16
 I used the Stata user-made prefix “pv” written by Kevin Macdonald (2014)  to do so. 
17
 Plausible values are used throughout international student test programmes to estimate performance. In the 
case of PISA data, five plausible values are available for each field of test, including mathematics (see OECD 
2009 for more information). 
18
 A particular concern in the analysis of Hanushek et al. (2013) is the correlation of 𝐼 with potential confounders 
varying at the country-by-wave level too, namely, educational reforms concomitant to a change in autonomy 
policies. However, they tested for several possible cofounders including national expenditures per student and 
found their results to be robust in every case. I do not perform these tests, in part due to a lack of data. 
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compare the pattern produced with their method to that which emerges from the IV approach. 
Results are presented in Table 2 in columns (1) and (2) for the Full PISA sample, and the 
EAG-PISA sample respectively
19
. They are in accordance with the central hypothesis of 
Hanushek et al. (2013): the main effect of autonomy is negative, but varies positively with 
initial GDP p.c.. These estimates are also statistically different from zero at the 1-percent level 
in both cases. 
Table 2 - Replication of Hanushek et al. (2013) 
Sample:   Full PISA sample EAG-PISA sample 
Country and year dummies: 
 
yes 
 
yes 
Autonomy measure: 
 
country 
 
country 
  
(1)   (2) 
          
Academic content autonomy 
 
-346.2*** 
 
-504.4*** 
  
(29.31) 
 
(59.19) 
Academic content autonomy x Initial GDP p.c. (log) 
 
33.74*** 
 
52.08*** 
 
(3.104) 
 
(6.024) 
     Observations 
 
1,591,278 
 
561,318 
R-squared 
 
0.425 
 
0.344 
GDP p.c. threshold 
 
28,590 
 
16,076 
Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: PISA math score. Each column corresponds to a different regression, 
estimated at the student level. Each regression includes controls for student and school characteristics as well as a dummy for 
observations with imputed values. See Table A2 for the list of controls. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Taking the Full PISA estimation, academic-content autonomy starts have a positive effect for 
a level of initial GDP p.c. of roughly $28,000 (in 2005 USD), regardless of whether or not 
GDP p.c. varies with time, which is higher than what was estimated by Hanushek et al. 
(2013), who found the threshold to lay at around $20,000. On the contrary, when using the 
EAG-PISA sample, which comprises mostly rich countries, the level of initial GDP p.c. for 
which the impact of autonomy becomes positive is lower than that of Hanushek et al. (2013) 
and than what I estimate with the Full PISA sample: it lays at around $16,000. This is 
probably due to the country composition of the EAG-PISA sample, which comprises mainly 
rich countries. 
So far, I can therefore say that Hanushek et al.’s (2013) central hypothesis is not rejected by 
my data when using their approach, i.e. a country-level measure of autonomy. However, the 
precise level of development for which autonomy becomes beneficial is not robust to changes 
                                                          
19
 I report only the coefficients of interest. The full list of controls can be found in Table A2., which shows the 
controls coefficients for the first-stage estimation of the 2-SLS procedure (see infra). The same controls are used 
in every regression. 
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in sample. It should thus be interpreted with caution. I now present the results which I obtain 
when measuring academic-content autonomy at the school-level. 
b. School-level analysis: instrumentation in the style of Gunnarsson et al.(2009) 
The baseline equation for the school-level analysis is roughly similar to that of Hanushek et 
al. (2013), to the exception that academic-content autonomy is measured at the school level: 
𝑇𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖 = 𝛼1𝐼𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝛼2(𝐼𝑐𝑡𝑠 × 𝐷𝑐) + 𝛽𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜇𝑐 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖 
I present two types of estimations for this model, one where academic-content autonomy is 
assumed to be exogenous, hence a simple least square estimation, and another where it is 
considered endogenous and therefore is instrumented. 
Table 3 presents the first stage results for the excluded instruments when running estimations 
for academic-content autonomy
20
. Generally speaking, the parameters of the excluded 
instruments point in the expected direction: if the law allows schools to take more decisions, 
then schools tend to be in fact more autonomous. They are jointly significant in every 
specification, while statistical significance for individual parameters varies across variables 
and specifications, owing to multicollinearity (see Table 1). 
Table A2a and A2b in the appendix show the results of the first stage for the controls. They 
provide a few insights on what drives de facto autonomy in schools apart from legislated 
autonomy. 
In this regard, there is no clear pattern regarding selection into autonomous schools, at least in 
the case of students. The pattern indeed seems to be that of a positive selection of teachers in 
autonomous schools, with a rather strong and statistically significant correlation between the 
share of fully certified teachers and academic-content autonomy. Regarding students, 
however, the evidence is mixed. There is a marginally significant and positive relationship 
between parents’ educational and occupational background and academic-content autonomy, 
supporting the idea of a positive selection of students. However, students whose home 
language is different from the teaching language tend to go to schools with more decisional 
power regarding curricula, thus mitigating the pattern of positive selection of students in 
autonomous schools. 
                                                          
20
 The IV procedure is implemented at the student level for each of the two stages for both forms of the baseline 
equation (linear & interacted). 
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Table 3 - First stage: excluded instruments 
Country and year dummies:   yes   yes   yes 
Instrumented variable: 
 
Std. Academic-
content autonomy 
 
Std. Academic-
content autonomy 
 
Std. Academic-
content autonomy x 
Initial GDP p.c. 
(log) 
   
   
   
   
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
              
EAG textbook choice  -0.0156 
 
1.289*** 
 
11.27** 
 (0.0231) 
 
(0.457) 
 
(4.539) 
EAG course offered  0.00488 
 
-1.028** 
 
-10.16** 
 (0.0260) 
 
(0.421) 
 
(4.123) 
EAG course content  0.0901*** 
 
-1.752** 
 
-17.30** 
 (0.0280) 
 
(0.815) 
 
(8.140) 
EAG textbook choice x Initial GDP p.c. (log)  
  
-0.132*** 
 
-1.164** 
 
  
(0.0459) 
 
(0.458) 
EAG course offered x Initial GDP p.c. (log)  
  
0.103** 
 
1.022** 
 
  
(0.0417) 
 
(0.409) 
EAG course content x Initial GDP p.c. (log)  
  
0.180** 
 
1.784** 
 
  
(0.0806) 
 
(0.806) 
       Observations 
 
449,498 
 
449,498 
 
449,498 
R-squared 
 
0.371 
 
0.372 
 
0.364 
F-test   9.99**   5.97***   5.66*** 
Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: see column headings. Each column corresponds to a different 
regression, estimated at the student level. Each regression includes controls for student and school characteristics as well as 
a dummy for observations with imputed values. See Table A2 for the list of controls. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 4 shows the results when running the OLS estimations and the second stage of the IV 
procedure for both the linear and the interacted versions of the baseline equation. The 2SLS 
results go in the same direction as Hanushek et al. (2013), with academic-content autonomy 
registering a base impact which is negative, but varying positively with GDP p.c.. The 
threshold beyond which the impact of academic-content autonomy becomes positive turns out 
to be more than twice lower than what I obtained on a similar sample, but using a country-
level measure. 
If comparing the least square estimates with the results of the instrumentation, it is possible to 
notice a downward bias, which probably stems from non-native speakers being more likely to 
attend schools that are autonomous in defining curricula. 
These results are more concrete when commented in terms of the estimated impact of a school 
gaining autonomy in defining academic content. Take for instance a country with an initial 
GDP p.c. close to that of Mexico, the poorest country in the EAG-PISA sample, at around 
$7,700 per capita in 2000 (in 2005 USD). At such a level of development, my estimations 
indicate that an increase in autonomy of one standard deviation decreases math score by 
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roughly -3.4 points on average, all else equal. In other words, in the case of a country like 
Mexico, autonomy has no educationally significant impact, in accordance with the results of 
Gunnarsson et al. (2009), obtained with a Latin American sample. However, if making out-of-
sample predictions, and taking the poorest country in the Full PISA sample, Indonesia, with 
an income per capita for year 2000 of roughly $1000, then a one standard deviation increase 
in academic-content autonomy reduces test score in mathematics by -75 points on average.  
At the other end of the income range, at a level of initial GDP p.c. comparable to Norway’s 
(i.e. over $62,000), a one standard deviation increase in autonomy increases students’ math 
score by over 70 points on average, all else equal. In lieu of illustration, it is useful to 
remember that PISA scores are scaled for one standard deviation to be equal to 100 across 
OECD countries. These impacts at both ends of the development spectrum are therefore 
relatively large. 
Table 4 - 2SLS estimates 
    OLS 2SLS 
Country and year dummies: 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
Autonomy measure: 
 
school 
 
school 
 
school 
 
school 
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
                  
Std. Academic-content autonomy 
 
-3.571*** 
 
-20.11** 
 
26.83 
 
-331.5*** 
  
(0.740) 
 
(9.818) 
 
(18.22) 
 
(116.5) 
Std. Academic-content autonomy x Initial 
GDP p.c. (log)   
1.669* 
   
36.67*** 
 
  
(1.000) 
   
(11.90) 
         Observations 
 
449,498 
 
449,498 
 
449,498 
 
449,498 
R-squared 
 
0.349 
 
0.349 
 
0.297 
 
0.246 
GDP p.c. threshold 
 
 n.a.  
 
170,951 
 
n.a. 
 
8,435 
Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: PISA math score. Each column corresponds to a different regression, 
estimated at the student level. Each regression includes controls for student and school characteristics as well as a dummy for 
observations with imputed values. See Table A2 for the list of controls. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The principal drawback from the school-level approach is that it makes it impossible to 
disentangle general equilibrium effects. For instance, an increase in autonomy for school 1 
may induce a competitive response from school 2. Alternatively, granting more autonomy to 
schools can alter the supply of teachers or school personnel in general. For the better, if future 
applicants welcome the new decision-making load, but also possibly for the worse, if they 
consider it as an additional burden. Regarding supply effects, I follow Hanushek et al. (2013) 
by controlling for math teacher shortage. Nonetheless, this sole variable can hardly capture 
supply effects on its own. Also, I have no way to control for possible competitive responses to 
autonomy at the local level because PISA data include no geographical dimensions apart from 
the national and federal levels.  
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Table A3 in the appendix presents the results which are obtained through both a simple least 
square estimation and an instrumental procedure, for the two other test subjects comprised in 
PISA, namely science and reading. Results are robust in the case of the former but not in that 
of the latter, for which adding an interaction term between academic-content autonomy and 
development yields insignificant results. In the case of science, where the estimated 
parameters of interest are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level, the threshold 
of GDP p.c. past which academic-content autonomy starts having a positive impact is quite 
similar to what I found in the case of mathematics (approx. $7,300 and $8,400 respectively). 
Next, I conclude this section with a discussion on parents participation and autonomy. 
c. School autonomy and parents participation 
Gunnarsson et al. (2009) argue that school autonomy and parents participation are two 
different empirical constructs in that, while being related to one another, they do not point to 
the exact same phenomena. Consequently the impact of autonomy on schooling outcomes is 
not well estimated if one doesn’t take into account parents participation. To be precise, they 
find contradictory coefficients when estimating the impact of autonomy with and without 
parents participation. Disregarding parents participation leads them to conclude on a positive 
and statistically significant impact of autonomy, while it is in fact negative and not significant 
when parents participation is included. This is consistent with the view that the impact of 
autonomy is partly dependent on the level of accountability, as noted by Hanushek et al. 
(2013). Further, Gunnarsson et al. (2009) actually finds a positive and significant effect of 
parents participation on test scores, in particular in language.  
I am therefore interested in testing two extensions of the initial hypothesis of Hanushek et al. 
(2013) concerning community involvement: is the effect of autonomy different from that of 
parents participation and are the estimates of the impact of autonomy altered by the inclusion 
of parents participation.  
Hanushek et al. (2013) implicitly include parents participation in their approach of measuring 
school autonomy. I argue along with Gunnarsson et al. (2009) that the two are distinct 
elements of schools’ decision-making process. In waves 2003, 2006 and 2009, PISA included 
a question which well embodies parental participation in its local accountability dimension. It 
mirrors the question asked to principal regarding autonomy by asking them to select bodies 
who have a direct influence on various affairs, including instructional content. The bodies in 
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question include parents groups. I therefore construct a discrete variable for parents 
participation in academic-content definition, which is set to one if the principal ticks the item 
corresponding to parents group for instructional content.  
EAG data do not include any equivalent for PISA 2009
21
. The EAG-PISA sample is therefore 
too limited to account for parents participation with the IV strategy. However, since the 
results of the instrumented school-level measures of autonomy are in accordance with the 
pattern found by the approach of Hanushek et al. (2013), it is possible to use their strategy to 
include parents participation in the estimations of the impact of academic-content autonomy 
on test scores. I therefore aggregate the parents participation dummies at the country-by-wave 
level by taking the proportions of schools where parents groups are influential in the 
instructional content. The sample for which these variables are available is more restricted 
than the Full PISA sample, but not as much as for the EAG-PISA sample. I select only 
countries which participated in the three relevant waves, 2003, 2006 and 2009. Specifically, 
these include 25 high-income countries, 7 upper-middle-income countries, 5 lower-middle-
income countries and 1 low-income country. In total, this amounts to 904,069 students from 
38 countries. 
My country-level measures of parents participation in instructional content are only weakly 
correlated with their equivalent in terms of school autonomy (0.265), as in the case of 
Gunnarsson et al. (2009), which supports their argument that participation is empirically 
different from autonomy. Consequently, results should not be plagued by multicollinearity. 
As mentioned earlier when describing the conceptual framework, the concerns which apply to 
autonomy in terms of agency may well apply to parents participation, albeit to different 
degrees. I therefore choose to let the impact of parents participation differ across initial GDP 
p.c., still in logs. 
Table 5 presents the estimations obtained for autonomy alone and along parents participation 
in academic-content, using the same sample. Including parents participation does not affect 
the general pattern of the impact of autonomy. It does however change significantly the 
threshold at which the impact of academic-content autonomy becomes positive, pushing it 
upward. The actual parents participation parameters have the expected signs and are 
                                                          
21
 In fact it is possible to use EAG data for year 2011 as to instrument parents participation as measured by PISA 
for year 2009, but it creates too big a discrepancy and leads to weak instruments which in turn produce no 
significant results. This can explained by the lesser inertia in changing the roles of parents at schools, compared 
to that of teachers for instance, which makes a two-year gap too rough an approximation. 
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statistically significant. What’s more, the impact of participation in academic-content 
switches sign at a much lower initial GDP p.c. level if compared to autonomy.  
Overall, these results are highly consistent with those of Gunnarsson et al. (2009), in that 
taking into account participation makes it harder for autonomy to have a positive impact (cf. 
higher threshold), while participation itself has a positive impact at a much lower level of 
GDP p.c., which could explain why they found autonomy to have no effect on achievement 
and participation to be a positive factor. Nonetheless, the thresholds identified for autonomy 
are extremely high. These results should therefore be interpreted with caution, in a 
comparative perspective between autonomy and participation. 
Finally, this is also consistent with the refinement of Hanushek et al.’s (2013) framework 
which I discussed earlier, i.e. that agency is less of an issue when decisional power is 
delegated to parents than when it is attributed to teachers for instance, hence the lower 
threshold for parents participation. This refinement of the conceptual framework can thus 
account for the pattern unearthed by Gunnarsson et al. (2009). 
Table 5 - Parents participation and autonomy 
Country and year dummies:   yes   yes 
Autonomy measure: 
 
country 
 
country 
   
(1) 
 
(5) 
            
Academic-content autonomy 
 
-177.2*** 
 
-166.8*** 
   
(35.17) 
 
(36.25) 
Academic-content autonomy x Initial GDP p.c. (log) 
 
13.09*** 
 
11.93*** 
 
(3.628) 
 
(3.756) 
Parents participation in acad. content 
   
-445.7*** 
   
(96.68) 
Parents participation in academic content x Initial GDP p.c. 
(log)    
44.11*** 
   
(10.33) 
      Observations 
 
904,069 
 
904,069 
R-squared 
 
0.412 
 
0.413 
GDP p.c. threshold: 
    
 
Autonomy 
 
756,949 
 
1,180,630 
 
Participation 
 
n.a. 
 
24,448 
Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: PISA math score. Each column corresponds to a different regression, 
estimated at the student level. Each regression includes controls for student and school characteristics as well as a dummy for 
observations with imputed values. See Table A2 for the list of controls. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
6. Conclusion 
By combining the approaches of Hanushek et al. (2013) and Gunnarsson et al. (2009), I am 
able to provide a solid test for the hypothesis of Hanushek et al. (2013), for the particular case 
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of academic-content autonomy. The main characteristics of my approach is indeed the 
combination of an instrumentation strategy, based on the distinction between legally 
prescribed and actual autonomy, with a pseudo-panel of PISA data, which allows me to 
confirm that the impact of academic-content autonomy is heterogeneous across levels of 
development, being negative or null for developing countries, but positive for developed 
countries. 
Also, I find that controlling for an exogenous measure of parents participation, interacted with 
level of development, makes it harder for autonomy to have a positive impact, since it pushes 
the threshold of GDP p.c. upward, which is consistent with the findings of Gunnarsson et al. 
(2009). Also in line with these authors is the fact that I find parents participation in academic-
content to have a positive impact at lower development levels if compared to autonomy. 
My findings therefore advocate nudging schools’ institutional set-ups towards parents 
participation rather than autonomous decision-making if one wants to improve the educational 
performance of students from developing countries. From a theoretical perspective, this can 
be explained by lesser agency issues when delegating decisional power to parents as opposed 
to other school agents such as teachers. 
Finally, to conclude with a note of caution, it is important to remember that the level of 
development for which the impact of school autonomy or parents participation becomes 
positive is sensitive to changes in sample characteristics, sometimes quite dramatically so. For 
this reason, the general pattern matters more than the numerical examples I give. 
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8. Appendix 
Table A1a - Descriptive statistics 
    GDP p.c. 
(constant 2005 
USD)  
PISA math scores 
  Academic-content 
autonomy 
   
  
2000 
 
2000 
 
2012 
 
2000 
 
2012 
    (1)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Low income countries 
         
Indonesia 
 
1,086 
 
366.7 
 
375.1 
 
.916 
 
.774 
Montenegro
b
 
 
3,974 
 
399.3 
 
409.6 
 
.077 
 
.252 
Serbia
b
 
 
3,527 
 
435.4 
 
448.9 
 
.075 
 
.153 
           
Lower-middle income countries 
         
Albania 
 
2,086 
 
381.2 
 
394.3 
 
.132 
 
.592 
Bulgaria 
 
2,707 
 
429.6 
 
438.7 
 
.720 
 
.352 
Brazil 
 
4,407 
 
333.9 
 
388.5 
 
.824 
 
.579 
Colombia
b
 
 
3,566 
 
370.0 
 
376.5 
 
.818 
 
.752 
Jordan
b
 
 
2,457 
 
384.0 
 
385.6 
 
.080 
 
.123 
Peru 
 
2,310 
 
292.1 
 
368.1 
 
.766 
 
.541 
Romania 
 
3,327 
 
425.5 
 
444.6 
 
.736 
 
.498 
Russian Federation 
 
3,870 
 
478.3 
 
482.2 
 
.958 
 
.603 
Thailand 
 
2,206 
 
432.3 
 
426.7 
 
.962 
 
.952 
Tunisia
a
 
 
2,992 
 
358.7 
 
387.8 
 
.094 
 
.296 
Turkey
a
 
 
6,179 
 
423.4 
 
448.0 
 
.598 
 
.179 
           
Upper-middle income countries 
         
Chile 
 
6,552 
 
383.5 
 
422.6 
 
.899 
 
.700 
Czech Republic 
 
10,380 
 
497.6 
 
499.0 
 
.877 
 
.899 
Estonia
b
 
 
11,367 
 
514.6 
 
520.6 
 
.740 
 
.839 
Croatia
b
 
 
10,593 
 
467.3 
 
471.1 
 
.152 
 
.209 
Hungary 
 
8,810 
 
488.0 
 
477.0 
 
.983 
 
.633 
Lithuania
b
 
 
8,603 
 
486.4 
 
478.8 
 
.665 
 
.856 
Latvia 
 
4,571 
 
462.8 
 
490.6 
 
.887 
 
.534 
Mexico 
 
7,689 
 
387.3 
 
413.3 
 
.657 
 
.312 
Poland
a
 
 
7,288 
 
490.2 
 
517.5 
 
.821 
 
.755 
Slovak Republic
a
 
 
10,186 
 
498.2 
 
481.6 
 
.754 
 
.666 
Uruguay
a
 
 
4,627 
 
422.2 
 
409.3 
 
.392 
 
.220 
Notes: PISA national math scores are computed according to the computation method recommended by the 
OECD (2009). National percentages for academic-content autonomy are computed based on non-imputed values 
and weighted using final student sampling probabilities. Countries in bold characters are included in the EAG-
PISA sample. The income classification follows that of the World Bank for year 2002. 
a
 PISA data refers to 2003 instead of 2000. 
b
 PISA data refers to 2006 instead of 2000. 
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Table A1b - Descriptive statistics 
    GDP p.c. 
(constant 2005 
USD)  
PISA math scores 
  Academic-content 
autonomy 
   
  
2000 
 
2000 
 
2012 
 
2000 
 
2012 
    (1)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
High income countries 
         
Australia 
 
30,870 
 
533.3 
 
504.2 
 
.932 
 
.706 
Austria 
 
35,027 
 
515.0 
 
505.5 
 
.691 
 
.595 
Belgium 
 
34,009 
 
519.6 
 
514.5 
 
.724 
 
.568 
Canada 
 
33,373 
 
533.0 
 
518.1 
 
.760 
 
.408 
Denmark 
 
45,340 
 
514.5 
 
500.0 
 
.889 
 
.684 
Finland 
 
33,217 
 
536.2 
 
518.8 
 
.954 
 
.659 
Germany 
 
32,662 
 
489.8 
 
513.5 
 
.551 
 
.612 
Greece 
 
18,041 
 
446.9 
 
453.0 
 
.903 
 
.035 
Hong Kong-China 
 
22,152 
 
560.5 
 
561.2 
 
.991 
 
.854 
Iceland 
 
46,986 
 
514.4 
 
492.8 
 
.797 
 
.687 
Ireland 
 
41,954 
 
502.9 
 
501.5 
 
.779 
 
.699 
Israel 
 
19,225 
 
433.0 
 
466.5 
 
.911 
 
.558 
Italy 
 
29,872 
 
457.4 
 
485.3 
 
.717 
 
.743 
Japan 
 
33,957 
 
556.6 
 
536.4 
 
.988 
 
.923 
Korea 
 
15,162 
 
546.8 
 
553.8 
 
.973 
 
.884 
Luxembourg 
 
72,394 
 
445.7 
 
489.9 
 
.000 
 
.137 
Macao-China
a
 
 
18,995 
 
527.3 
 
538.1 
 
.992 
 
.917 
Netherlands 
 
37,547 
 
563.8 
 
523.0 
 
.956 
 
.940 
New Zealand 
 
24,362 
 
536.9 
 
499.8 
 
.958 
 
.859 
Norway
a
 
 
62,454 
 
495.2 
 
489.4 
 
.571 
 
.475 
Portugal 
 
17,891 
 
453.7 
 
487.1 
 
.560 
 
.474 
Qatar
b
 
 
58,066 
 
318.0 
 
376.5 
 
.234 
 
.157 
Slovenia
b
 
 
18,839 
 
504.5 
 
501.1 
 
.276 
 
.440 
Spain 
 
23,921 
 
476.3 
 
484.3 
 
.798 
 
.529 
Sweden 
 
36,576 
 
509.8 
 
478.3 
 
.874 
 
.531 
Switzerland 
 
50,188 
 
529.3 
 
530.9 
 
.381 
 
.298 
United Kingdom 
 
34,059 
 
529.2 
 
493.9 
 
.978 
 
.914 
United States   40,965   493.2   481.4   .912   .419 
Notes: PISA national math scores are computed according to the computation method recommended by the 
OECD (2009). National percentages for academic-content autonomy are computed based on non-imputed 
values and weighted using final student sampling probabilities. Countries in bold characters are included in the 
EAG-PISA sample. The income classification follows that of the World Bank for year 2002. 
a
 PISA data refers to 2003 instead of 2000. 
b
 PISA data refers to 2006 instead of 2000. 
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Figure A1 - De jure and de facto autonomy through time: textbook choice 
Notes: Country codes: AUS-Australia; AUT-Austria; CZE-Czech Republic; DEU-Germany; DNK-Denmark; 
ESP-Spain; FIN-Finland; GBR-United Kingdom; GRC-Greece; HUN-Hungary; ISL-Iceland; ITA-Italy; JPN-
Japan; KOR-Korea. Rep.; LUX-Luxembourg; MEX-Mexico; NLD-Netherlands; NOR-Norway; NZL-New 
Zealand; PRT-Portugal; SWE-Sweden. De jure autonomy is represented by the solid line and de facto autonomy 
is depicted as a dashed line. The left-hand y-axis refers to the former and the right-hand y-axis to the latter. De 
facto autonomy is measured as the country-by-wave average, which is basically the same as Hanushek et al.’s 
(2013) measure since the average of a dummy yields a proportion. 
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Figure A2 - De jure and de facto autonomy through time: course content 
Notes: Country codes: AUS-Australia; AUT-Austria; CZE-Czech Republic; DEU-Germany; DNK-Denmark; 
ESP-Spain; FIN-Finland; GBR-United Kingdom; GRC-Greece; HUN-Hungary; ISL-Iceland; ITA-Italy; JPN-
Japan; KOR-Korea. Rep.; LUX-Luxembourg; MEX-Mexico; NLD-Netherlands; NOR-Norway; NZL-New 
Zealand; PRT-Portugal; SWE-Sweden. De jure autonomy is represented by the solid line and de facto autonomy 
is depicted as a dashed line. The left-hand y-axis refers to the former and the right-hand y-axis to the latter. De 
facto autonomy is measured as the country-by-wave average, which is basically the same as Hanushek et al.’s 
(2013) measure since the average of a dummy yields a proportion. 
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Figure A3 - De jure and de facto autonomy through time: course offered 
Notes: Country codes: AUS-Australia; AUT-Austria; CZE-Czech Republic; DEU-Germany; DNK-Denmark; 
ESP-Spain; FIN-Finland; GBR-United Kingdom; GRC-Greece; HUN-Hungary; ISL-Iceland; ITA-Italy; JPN-
Japan; KOR-Korea. Rep.; LUX-Luxembourg; MEX-Mexico; NLD-Netherlands; NOR-Norway; NZL-New 
Zealand; PRT-Portugal; SWE-Sweden. De jure autonomy is represented by the solid line and de facto autonomy 
is depicted as a dashed line. The left-hand y-axis refers to the former and the right-hand y-axis to the latter. De 
facto autonomy is measured as the country-by-wave average, which is basically the same as Hanushek et al.’s 
(2013) measure since the average of a dummy yields a proportion. 
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Table A2a - Included instruments: student characteristics 
Country and year dummies:   yes   yes   yes 
Instrumented variable: 
 
Std. Academic-
content autonomy 
 
Std. Academic-
content autonomy 
 Std. Academic-
content autonomy 
x Initial GDP p.c. 
(log) 
   
   
   
    (1)   (2)   (3) 
        Female 
 
-0.00648 
 
-0.00707 
 
-0.0695 
   
(0.00727) 
 
(0.00724) 
 
(0.0727) 
Age (years) 
 
0.0218** 
 
0.0225** 
 
0.182* 
   
(0.0108) 
 
(0.0107) 
 
(0.106) 
Immigration background 
      
 
Native student 
      
        
 
First-Generation students 
 
-0.0336 
 
-0.0295 
 
-0.295 
   
(0.0246) 
 
(0.0246) 
 
(0.248) 
 
Non-native students 
 
-0.0281 
 
-0.0196 
 
-0.184 
   
(0.0250) 
 
(0.0255) 
 
(0.255) 
Test language spoken at home 
 
-0.0559** 
 
-0.0422 
 
-0.382 
   
(0.0250) 
 
(0.0256) 
 
(0.242) 
Parents education 
      
 
None 
      
        
 
Primary 
 
0.0160 
 
0.0169 
 
0.184 
   
(0.0328) 
 
(0.0327) 
 
(0.296) 
 
Lower secondary 
 
0.0556* 
 
0.0562* 
 
0.498* 
   
(0.0329) 
 
(0.0329) 
 
(0.298) 
 
Upper secondary I 
 
0.0370 
 
0.0404 
 
0.360 
   
(0.0355) 
 
(0.0350) 
 
(0.320) 
 
Upper secondary II 
 
0.0495 
 
0.0503 
 
0.442 
   
(0.0333) 
 
(0.0331) 
 
(0.300) 
 
University 
 
0.0633* 
 
0.0628* 
 
0.556* 
   
(0.0355) 
 
(0.0354) 
 
(0.322) 
Parents occupation 
      
 
None 
      
        
 
Blue collar low skilled 
 
0.0689*** 
 
0.0691*** 
 
0.674*** 
   
(0.0255) 
 
(0.0254) 
 
(0.247) 
 
Blue collar high skilled 
 
0.0470** 
 
0.0476** 
 
0.467** 
   
(0.0228) 
 
(0.0228) 
 
(0.225) 
 
White collar low skilled 
 
0.0339 
 
0.0343 
 
0.368* 
   
(0.0217) 
 
(0.0216) 
 
(0.215) 
 
White collar high skilled 
 
0.0402* 
 
0.0418* 
 
0.416* 
   
(0.0223) 
 
(0.0221) 
 
(0.219) 
Books at home 
      
 
0-10 books 
      
        
 
11-100 books 
 
0.0184* 
 
0.0185* 
 
0.149 
   
(0.0105) 
 
(0.0105) 
 
(0.0992) 
 
101-500 books 
 
0.00321 
 
0.00319 
 
0.0134 
   
(0.0115) 
 
(0.0115) 
 
(0.111) 
 
More than 500 
 
-0.0153 
 
-0.0169 
 
-0.179 
   
(0.0132) 
 
(0.0130) 
 
(0.127) 
        Observations 
 
449,498 
 
449,498 
 
449,498 
R-squared   0.371   0.372   0.364 
Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: see column headings. Each column corresponds to a different regression, 
estimated at the student level. Each regression includes controls for student and school characteristics as well as a dummy for 
observations with imputed values. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2b - Included instruments: school characteristics 
Country and year dummies:   yes   yes   yes 
Instrumented variable: 
 
Std. Academic-
content 
autonomy 
 
Std. Academic-
content 
autonomy 
 Std. Academic-
content autonomy 
x Initial GDP p.c. 
(log) 
   
   
   
    (1)   (2)   (3) 
        Number of students 
 
9.52e-05*** 
 
9.45e-05*** 
 
0.000831*** 
   
(2.08e-05) 
 
(2.09e-05) 
 
(0.000200) 
Share of government funding 
 
-0.000248 
 
-0.000240 
 
-0.00235 
   
(0.000527) 
 
(0.000526) 
 
(0.00486) 
Share of fully certified teachers at school 
 
0.103** 
 
0.102** 
 
0.778* 
   
(0.0418) 
 
(0.0419) 
 
(0.410) 
Shortage of math teachers 
 
0.0134 
 
0.0129 
 
0.147 
   
(0.0129) 
 
(0.0130) 
 
(0.128) 
School location 
      
 
Village 
      
        
 
Small Town 
 
0.0220 
 
0.0200 
 
0.119 
   
(0.0517) 
 
(0.0518) 
 
(0.491) 
 
Town 
 
0.0418 
 
0.0401 
 
0.359 
   
(0.0476) 
 
(0.0478) 
 
(0.449) 
 
City 
 
0.0436 
 
0.0412 
 
0.399 
   
(0.0517) 
 
(0.0516) 
 
(0.485) 
 
Large City 
 
0.0420 
 
0.0409 
 
0.362 
   
(0.0601) 
 
(0.0600) 
 
(0.568) 
        Observations 
 
449,498 
 
449,498 
 
449,498 
R-squared   0.371   0.372   0.364 
Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: see column headings. Each column corresponds to a different regression, 
estimated at the student level. Each regression includes controls for student and school characteristics as well as a dummy for 
observations with imputed values. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A3 – OLS and 2SLS results for science and reading 
    OLS   2SLS   OLS   2SLS 
Test subject: 
 
science 
 
science 
 
science 
 
science 
 
reading 
 
reading 
 
reading 
 
reading 
Country and year dummies: 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
Autonomy measure: 
 
school 
 
school 
 
school 
 
school 
 
school 
 
school 
 
school 
 
school 
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
                  
        Std. Academic-content autonomy  -3.203*** 
 
13.46 
 
44.21* 
 
-587.3*** 
 
-2.745*** 
 
-2.656 
 
74.85** 
 
-76.81 
 (0.767) 
 
(9.296) 
 
(24.47) 
 
(163.8) 
 
(0.807) 
 
(9.384) 
 
(29.41) 
 
(160.0) 
Std. Academic-content autonomy x 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) 
 
  
-1.682* 
   
66.01*** 
   
-0.00902 
   
12.61 
 
  
(0.955) 
   
(16.84) 
   
(0.956) 
   
(15.52) 
                 Observations 
 
449,462 
 
449,462 
 
449,462 
 
449,462 
 
476,452 
 
476,452 
 
476,452 
 
476,452 
R-squared   0.329   0.329   0.208   -0.049   0.316   0.316   -0.018   0.169 
Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: PISA score (see column headings for the relevant test subjects). Each column corresponds to a different regression, estimated at the student 
level. Each regression includes controls for student and school characteristics as well as a dummy for observations with imputed values. See Table A2 for the list of controls. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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